How the Kurds lost control of north-eastern Syria

Statues of the Kurds’ proud female fighters were pulled down by the banks of the Euphrates. Their American-supplied Humvees lay abandoned by the sides of roads. In a matter of days, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led militia that was America’s partner in the decade-long campaign against Islamic State (is), collapsed—and with it the Kurdish experiment in autonomy in Syria.

The collapse began after year-long negotiations between the sdf and Damascus floundered. Fighting had broken out on January 6th between government and sdf troops in a Kurdish part of Aleppo, Syria’s second city, prompting the government to send more troops. Barely a week later, the sdf withdrew from Aleppo. Syria’s tribes, sensing it was time to split from the Kurds and ally with Syria’s government, mobilised. That spelled the end for the sdf.

The group’s military campaign against is was internationally lauded, but its ensuing political project became unsustainable as it tried to govern Arab-majority parts of Syria. Cities in the north-east such as Raqqa, freed from is by the Kurds but home to large Sunni tribal populations, were restive under sdf rule. In recent years the SDF had grown more autocratic. Celebrating Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s new president, and waving the Syrian revolutionary flag became grounds for arrest. “This is our liberation,” said an Arab lawyer in Raqqa.

By the time government forces reached Raqqa and northern Deir ez-Zor, much of the region had fallen to tribal fighters. Thousands of Arab recruits in the sdf defected. There was little fighting. At the same time Mr Sharaa issued a presidential decree recognising Kurdish cultural rights, eroding the sdf’s negotiating position.

The options for the sdf are bleak. Its units are to be dismantled and its fighters integrated into the Syrian army; there will be no Kurdish-majority units. The autonomous administration built during the war against is will be incorporated into the new state. Weeks ago, the group was offered a better deal: three army divisions and a senior defence post for its leader, Mazloum Abdi.

America no longer seems to regard the sdf as useful to its strategy in the region. Its envoy to Syria said that the group’s original mission had “largely expired” and that the Kurds’ best hope now lies with the government of Mr Sharaa. Internal divisions have weakened the group further.

On January 20th the government announced a four-day truce to give the sdf time to hand over control of its institutions. Government troops gathered near Hasakeh, a city with a big Kurdish population, said they expected to advance once the truce expired. A Syrian government official told The Economist that unless Kurdish forces surrendered by then, they would be attacked. But seizing Kurdish towns, which are still heavily fortified, would be bloody. Syria’s Kurds also fear sectarian violence. Government fighters described Qamishli as a city of wealthy Kurds that would be a good place to steal cars.

Another danger remains. For years the sdf has guarded tens of thousands of is detainees, including women and children, in north-eastern Syria. Amid the chaos, more than 100 have escaped prison. The SDF’s collapse may have ended one war, but it risks sowing the seeds of another. ■